Taiwan Status Research
compiled beginning Nov. 2009






THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN'S LEGAL STATUS
            The Failure to Achieve a Solution in the Eisenhower administration

        (p. 388) Taiwan Policy was under active review prior to Eisenhower's inauguration, and the review process was continue in connection with the deneutralization policy. In the process, (Ambassador) Karl Rankin, who all along had been urging for a more positive policy toward Taiwan, asked several questions pertinent to the planning of economic and military aid programs that the previous administration had evaded. . . . . . Lastly, did the U.S. wish to make a formal committment to solve the problem of Taiwan's legal status or to support the Nationalist objective of returning to the mainland?

        (p. 389) The new administration's answers to the above questions, after almost one year of deliberation, failed to be as clear-cut as desired by Ambassador Rankin and his host government.

        (p. 391) The sticky problem of Taiwan's legal status, though, remained unresolved. It was a delicate question that Washington found difficult to answer and chose to overlook whenever possible. The Eisenhower administration gradually stopped planning according to the premise that Taiwan was a part of China and U.S. policy toward Taipei and Peking a zero sum game. . . . . . Consequently, Taiwan did not have to either be annexed by Communist China or become independent. It could exist in a grey zone without clear legal status as long as it served U.S. interests.

        (p. 396) Therefore, what the Eisenhower administration did with regard to Taiwan during the first year of its tenure was ruling out a few policy options while leaving the most difficult questions unanswered. Politically, it decided not to turn the island into a U.S. trusteeship, continued to recognize the Nationalist government as the government of China, and was against seating Peking in the international bodies. It chose to ignore the question of Taiwan's legal status and both Chinese governments' claims that Taiwan belonged to China, while embracing an ambiguous stance that left the island neither Chinese nor non-Chinese.

        (p. 398) Resolving not to decide whether to apply nuclear weapons upon the Korean situation, the administration displayed similar reluctance to make difficult decisions in the shaping of its Taiwan policy. It deferred to make a choice regarding the ultimate status of Taiwan. It similarly evaded to deal with the paradox implied in its proclamation that the National government on Taiwan represented all of the Chinese people. What kind of logic is it that a government should represent China in the UN but not be "allowed," or "deemed unable," to regain control of the Chinese territory? Such was the logic of Eisenhower's Taiwan policy. And what use is a goal which is inattainable in the first place? Yet, such was precisely the implication of the administration's China policy as prescribed in NSC 166/1.

[ source: UNLEASHING CHIANG KAI-SHEK?
Eisenhower and the Policy of Indecision toward Taiwan, 1953
.
Published by the Institute of Modern History (IMH),
Academia Sinica (AS), Taipei, Taiwan:
COLLECTED PAPERS: vol. 20 (June 1991), author: Su-ya Chang ]
See -- IMH AS page for quote A




FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
         

Aide-Memoire: The Department of State to the Chinese Embassy, Washington, November 21, 1946
Subject: status of Taiwanese in Japan

. . . It should, however, be pointed out that from the legal standpoint the transfer of Taiwan's sovereignty remains to be formalized . . . .

[ source: United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1946. The Far East, Volume VIII, (1946) ]
See -- FRUS page for quote 1




Memorandum: Conversation, in the Dept. of State, Jan. 6 - Jan 13, 1951
Subject: Korea, China, and Formosa

As one of the victor powers we have residual rights there until a Japanese peace treaty has been made. The Cairo declaration manifested our intention. It did not itself constitute a cession of territory.

[ source: United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. Korea and China   Volume VII, Part 2 (1951), page 1481 ]
See -- FRUS page for quote 2




Letter: Sec. of State Acheson to US Mission at the United Nations, June 2, 1952
Subject: Policy of the United States with respect to atomic energy and the regulation of armaments

(4) FYI US position is that sovereignty over Formosa not yet finally determined therefore seek to avoid issue of whether Formosa part of China for purposes of determining numerical ceilings.

[ source: Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. National security affairs, Volume II, Part 2 (1952-1954) ]
See -- FRUS page for quote 3




Memorandum: Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State, Dec. 14, 1954
Subject: Operation "Oracle"

The British almost certainly expect the question of the unresolved juridical status of Formosa to be injected into the debate.

[ source: United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 1 (1952-1954) ]
See -- FRUS page for quote 4




Memorandum: Department of State, Washington, July 1, 1955
Subject: Lessening of Tension in the Taiwan Area

. . . Even the juridical position of Taiwan is in doubt. The United States also has an interest in Taiwan which we got away from Japan. Japan has merely renounced sovereignty over Taiwan which has not been disposed of by the peace treaty and not ceded to anyone. Consequently the United States could assert a legal claim until Taiwan is disposed of by some means. We cannot, therefore, admit that the disposition of Taiwan is merely an internal problem.

[ source: United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. China, Volume II, (1955-1957) ]
See -- FRUS page for quote 5




Memorandum: Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Economic Affairs (Jones), June 10, 1956
Subject: Paracel Islands

During the discussion, the Secretary pointed out that we might consider acting under the Japanese Treaty since the U.S. has residual responsibility over all former Japanese territories.

[ source: United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. China, Volume III, (1955-1957) ]
See -- FRUS page for quote 6






FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
          quotations from documents, noting the US interest in the future disposal of Formosa

In any event, in so far as Japan is concerned, the United States is the principal occupying power and its weight of opinion is strong enough to carry along the majority of the other FEC countries.

[ source: Foreign relations of the United States, 1947. The Far East
Volume VI (1947) ]
See -- FRUS page for quote 7




. . . undoubtedly the contemplated action would be misinterpreted as a desire to put the future disposal of Formosa out of the US Government's independent control just in time to prevent the new Congress from asserting its influence upon this most controversial item of American foreign policy.

[ source: Foreign relations of the United States, 1950. East Asia and the Pacific
Volume VI (1950) ]
See -- FRUS page for quote 8




The United States, as a principal victor of the war in the Pacific and as the sole occupying power of Japan has great responsibility in the disposition of Formosa; . . .

[ source: Foreign relations of the United States, 1950. East Asia and the Pacific
Volume VI (1950) ]
See -- FRUS page for quote 9




. . . that no formal act restoring sovereignty over these territories to China has yet occurred; . . .

[ source: Foreign relations of the United States, 1950. East Asia and the Pacific
Volume VI (1950) ]
See -- FRUS page for quote 10




Generalissimo recalled that he took over Formosa as Allied Commander of Chinese theater pending peace -treaty while General MacArthur took over Japan and other areas ,as SCAP; now Chinese government was here, but he hoped despite this fact Struble would not feel he coming to foreign territory in visiting Formosa.

[ source: Foreign relations of the United States, 1950. East Asia and the Pacific Volume VI (1950)]
See -- FRUS page for quote 11




In this connection it may be noted that Japan never ceded sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores to China. Japan renounced its own sovereignty but left the future title undefined. Thus the United States as principal victor of Japan has an unsatisfied interest in these former Japanese islands . . .

[ source: Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. China and Japan (in two parts)
Volume XIV, Part 1 (1952-1954) ]
See -- FRUS page for quote 12


Note: Taiwan was sovereign Japanese territory until ceded in the SFPT effective April 28, 1952. However, ROC claims to sovereignty over Taiwan all arise from the Oct. 25, 1945 announcement of "Taiwan Retrocession Day."




AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES: TAIWAN IS NOT CHINESE TERRITORY

AUTHORITATIVE SOURCES


Oct. 6, 1959   Sheng v. Rogers (D.C. Circuit)

Jan.     1963   Mandate for Change 1953-1956 by Dwight D. Eisenhower

Jul. 13, 1971   Starr Memorandum of US Dept. of State

Jul. 9, 2007   Congressional Research Service Report

Mar. 24, 2008   Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 1865




DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Sept. 2008   Mandatory Guidance from Department of State Regarding Contact with Taiwan




ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT REFERENCES

Aug. 27, 1950   Truman's Letter Restating the U.S. Position on Formosa   written to Ambassador Warren Austin

Feb. 5, 2009   Court of Appeals Oral Argument Transcript   Roger C. S. Lin et al. v. United States of America

Oct. 27, 2009   My Interrogation at the Taipei Prosecutor's Office   by Roger C. S. Lin




ROC GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

ROC government in exile  




WASHINGTON D.C. COURT CASE

Roger C. S. Lin et al. v. United States of America





BACKGROUND INFORMATION:
CIVIL RIGHTS IN US OVERSEAS TERRITORIES


Dec. 20, 2001   Virgin Islands Amicus Brief   Analysis of insular law issues, civil rights of persons in US overseas territories, etc.